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HONOR THY PROMISE: WHY THE DUTCH 
DRUG POLICIES SHOULD NOT BE A 
BARRIER TO THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION 
OFTHESCHENGENAGREEMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
The European Union (EU) has long proposed the elimination of 
internal border controls to allow for the freedom of movement 
among Member States.1 This idea was initially intended to facilitate 
economic activity but has gradually come to encompass the freedom 
of movement for all members of the EU for business or pleasure.2 To 
date, the full implementation ofthis idea is still a dream for the EU.3 
In an effort to begin the process of eliminating barriers to 
movement, several members4 of the European Community (EC), the 
precursor to the EU, signed the Schengen Agreement which would 
gradually eliminate border control measures among the signatory na-
tions.5 This agreement still awaits full implementation by some of the 
signatories, in part because of differing "iews of narcotics control and, 
more specifically, objections to the Netherlands' liberal drug policies.6 
1 See Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992, Belg.-Den.-Fl:-F.RG.-
Greece-Ir.-ltaly-Lux.-Neth.-Port.-Spain-U.K., 31 I.L.M. 247, 259 (1992) [hereinafter Maas-
tricht Treaty]. The Maastricht Treaty transformed the European Community (EC) into the 
EU. The objectives of the EU are consistent with those of the EC. See id. art. B. 
2 See Ricou Heaton, The European Community After 1992: The Freedom of Mavement of People 
and Its Limitations, 25 VAND. J. 1'RANSNAT'L L. 643, 647-48 (1992). 
3 See Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Es-
tablishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts-Consolidated version of 
the Treaty on European Union, Protocol integrating the Schengen aquis into the frame-
work ofthe European Union, 1997 OJ. (C 340) 2,93 [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]. 
4 See Schengen Agreement on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common 
Borders and the Convention Applying the Agreement, June 14, 1985, Belg.-Fr.-F.D.R-Lux.-
Neth., 30 I.L.M. 68 (1991). The agreement was originally signed by France, Gennany, Bel-
gium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Id. This agreement consists of two parts: the 
1985 Schengen Agreement and the 1990 Convention Applying the Agreement. See id. For 
the purposes of this Note, "the Schengen Agreement" refers to the document in its en-
tirety and "the Convention" refers to the latter portion of the document. 
5 See Schengen Agreement, supra note 4. The agreement was named after the town in 
Luxembourg where it was signed. See Heaton, supra note 2, at 656. 
6 See Eric Thomas Berkman, Sacrificed Savereignt)'?: Dutch Soft Drug Policy in the Spech'l' of 
Europe without Borders, 19 B.c. INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 173, 17&-77 (1996). See also Henk van 
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However, in light of the actual situation in the Netherlands and the 
surrounding region, the concerns regarding the opening of borders 
because of drug laws appear to be misplaced.7 
This Note explains the current drug policy of the Netherlands 
and illustrates that the refusal to implement the Schengen Agreement 
is a denial of the freedom of movement that the agreement advocates. 
Part I outlines the goals and agreements regarding the freedom of 
movement. It also describes the drug policies of the Netherlands and 
the positive results these policies have achieved. Part II focuses on 
concerns of drug trafficking in the EU and the resistence of the signa-
tory nations, particularly France, to fully implement the Schengen 
Agreement based on these concerns. Part III analyzes the concerns of 
the signatory nations in relation to the drug policies and the resulting 
situation in the Netherlands. Part IV concludes that these fears are 
founded on a misconception, and therefore, the agreement to elimi-
nate barriers to movement should be fully implemented unless an ac-
tual threat is posed. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Development of open Borders 
In 1992, the Treaty on European Union and Final Act (the Maas-
tricht Treaty) established the Eu.s The Maastricht Treaty grants EU 
citizenship to "[e]very person holding the nationality of a Member 
State .... ''9 As an element of EU citizenship, the concepts of open 
internal borders and freedom of movement have been primary goals 
since the inception of the EU.lo Article Sa of the Maastricht Treaty 
declares "[e]very citizen of the Union shall have the right to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States .... "II 
Furthermore, the treaties which established the EC also embodied the 
Vliet, The Uneasy Decriminalization: 1t Perspective on Dutch Drug Policy, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 717 
(1990). 
7 See DIRK J. KORF, DUTCH TREAT 48 (1995); C.M. Ottevanger, Drug Policy and Drug 
TOll/ism, in SCHENGEN, JUDICIAL COOPERATION AND POLICY COORDINATION 165, 176 
(Monica den Boer ed., 1997); AM. van Kalmthout, Charactetistics of Dnlg Policy in the Nether-
lands, in DRUG POLICIES IN WESTERN EUROPE 259, 262 (Hans-Jorg Albrecht & Anton van 
Kalmthout eds., 1989). 
8 See Maastricht Treaty, supra note l. 
9Id. art. 8. 
10 See id. art. 8a. 
11 Id. 
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cry for the elimination of barriers to movement.12 The idea of open 
borders was originally market-oriented and specifically intended to 
facilitate the movement of workers among Member States, but the 
concept has expanded to include all movement between Member 
States.13 Although this concept was incorporated into the Treaty of 
Amsterdam,14 which amends the Maastricht Treaty, the goal of free 
movement still has not been fully achieved throughout the EU.l5 
In 1985, seven years before the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, a 
number of then EC Member States began discussions regarding their 
own agreement to open internal borders and to strengthen external 
borders.16 These discussions resulted in the signing of the Schengen 
Agreement on June 14, 1985, which required each signatory to pre-
pare proposals for the gradual abolition of internal border controls.l7 
Three of the signatories to this agreement-Belgium, the Nether-
lands, and Luxembourg (the Benelux countries)-had been operat-
ing with open borders amongst themselves since 1960.18 On June 19, 
1990, the Schengen Agreement signatories subsequently concluded 
the Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 
Between the Governments of the States ofthe Benelux Economic Un-
ion, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic, on 
the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders.19 The 
resulting document (the Convention) attempted to set forth rules of 
implementation.2o 
12 See The Single European Act, Feb. 17, 1986, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R 741 (1987) [herein-
after SEA]. The SEA reads, in pertinent part: ''The internal market shall comprise an area 
without internal frontiers in which the free moyement of goods, persons, services and 
capital is ensured in accordance with the prmi.sions of this Treaty." Id. at 747. See also Hea-
ton, supra note 2, at 644,647. 
13 See Heaton, supra note 2, at 647-48. 
14 See Treaty of Amsterdanl, supra note 3. Ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam does 
not force open borders because, by incorporating the Schengen Agreement, Article 2(2) 
of the Convention relating to border controls for public policy or national security reasons 
is also incOlporated. See id.; Convention, supra note 4, art. 2(2); infra notes 23-29 and ac-
companying text. 
15 See Joined Cases C-65/95 and C-l11/95, The Queen ,'. Secretary of the State for the 
Home Dept., ex parte Mann Singh Shingara and Abbas Radiom, 1997 E.C.R 1-3343, 3354 
n.9 (finding United Kingdom's border control measures valid because Schengen Agree-
ment is not matter of Community law). 
16 See Schengen Agreement, supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
17 Schengen Agreement, supra note 4, at Introductory Note. See Berkman, supra note 6, 
at 176; Heaton, supra note 2, at 654; Juliall J.E. Schutte, Sc1umgen: Its Meaning for the Free 
Movement of Persons in Europe, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 549, 549-50 (1991). 
18 See Schutte, supra note 17, at 550. 
19 Convention, supra note 4, at 84. 
20 See Schengen Agreement, supra note 4, at Introductory Note. 
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The Schengen Agreement began as an informal gesture between 
France and the Federal Republic of Germany, intended to make pro-
gress toward achieving freedom of movement within the EC-and 
later the EU.21 The Franco-German gesture prompted officials of the 
Benelux countries to seize the opportunity to begin discussions re-
garding the opening of borders among all five nations.22 Although the 
Schengen Agreement calls for the elimination of border checks at its 
internal borders, the signatories were unwilling to relinquish all 
power concerning control of their borders.23 Article 2(2) of the Con-
vention reserves the power of each signatory state to exercise border 
control measures "[w]here public policy or national security so re-
quire .... "24 Unless deemed an emergency, the affected nations must 
be consulted by the signatory wishing to impose border control meas-
ures under the Article 2 reservation.25 This is akin to a goodwill re-
quirement, however, because the affected country, or countries, need 
not approve.26 Additionally, the Convention contains nothing that de-
scribes an appropriate use of this reservation, other than the provi-
sion that border checks "appropriate to the situation" may be con-
ducted for a limited period when public policy or national security so 
require.27 However, no delineated criteria indicate when public policy 
21 See Schutte, supra note 17, at 549. 
22 See id. Since the original agreement, Italy, Spain, and Portugal have joined the 
agreement. See Anne Van Lanckel; Transparency and Accountability of Schengen, in SCHENGEN, 
JUDICIAL COOPERATION AND POLICY COORDINATION, supra note 7, at 61, 62 & n.3. 
23 See Convention, supra note 4, art. 2. See also Heaton, supra note 2, at 664; Schutte, su-
pra note 17, at 552. 
24 See Convention, supra note 4, art. 2(2). See al50 Schutte, supra note 17, at 552. Article 
2 of the 1990 Schengen Convention provides, in pertinent part: 
1. Internal borders may be crossed at any point without any checks on per-
sons being carried out. 
2. 'Where public policy or national secmity so require, howevel; a Contracting 
Party may, after consulting with other Contracting Parties, decide that for a 
limited period national border checks appropriate to the situation will be car-
ried out at internal borders. If public policy or national secUlity require im-
mediate action, the Contracting Party concerned shall take the necessary 
measmes and shall inform the other Contracting Parties thereof at the earli-
est opportunity. 
3. The abolition of checks on persons at internal borders shall not affect ... 
the exercise of police powers by the competent authOlities under each Con-
u'acting Party's legislation throughout its territory .... 
Convention, supra note 4, art. 2. 
25 See id. art. 2 (2). See also Van Lancker, supra note 22, at 63. 
26 See Van Lancker, supra note 22, at 63. 
27 See Convention, supra note 4, art. 2. 
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or national security would require such emergency border checks.28 
Thus, there is no effective control over the maintenance of the open 
borders.29 
B. Drug Policies of the Netherlands 
The attitude towards, and policies regarding, drugs in the Neth-
erlands is different than in most nations, including the other signato-
ries of the Schengen Agreement.3o In fact, the drug policies of the 
Netherlands have been described as appearing "at the opposite [end] 
of the [continuum]" from France, one of the signatory nations.31 The 
Dutch view drugs and drug use as a social welfare issue as well as a 
criminal one.32 This is evident from the fact that the Departments of 
Health, Justice and the Interior share the responsibilities of adminis-
tering the drug policy.33 In addressing drug and drug use issues, the 
Dutch make a distinction between "hard drugs," or "drugs presenting 
unacceptable risks" (i.e., cocaine and heroin), and "soft drugs," or 
"cannabis products" (i.e., marijuana and hashish).34 
The drug policy of the Netherlands is based on the Opium Act of 
1928 as amended in 1976.35 The amendments were integrated as part 
of Dutch welfare legislation, rather than criminal legislation.36 The 
policy acknowledges the fact that, by virtue of human nature, people 
experiment with drugs,37 and society's demand cannot be eradicated 
by prohibition.38 Therefore, instead of strict prohibition, the policy 
follows the principles of "separate markets" and "risk-reduction"39 
28 See id. 
29 See id. 
30 See KORF, supra note 7, at 46-47. See, e.g., HJ. Albrecht, Drug PoliC)' in the Federal Re-
public of Germany, in DRUG POLICIES IN WESTERN EUROPE, supra note 7, at 175, 177-79; E. 
Boutmans, The Situation in Belgium, in DRUG POLICIES IN \\'ESTERN EUROPE, supra note 7, at 
89, 89-90; J. Bernat de Celis, France's Policy Convening Illegal Dl1lg Users, in DRUG POLICIES 
IN WESTERN EUROPE, supra note 7, at 143,144-47. 
31 Otteyanger, supra note 7, at 166. 
32 See id. 
33 See id. 
34 See Berkman, supra note 6, at 178-79; van Vliet, supra note 6, at 724. 
35 See Berkman, supra note 6, at 177; \'an Vliet, supra note 6, at 724. 
36 See van Vliet, supra note 6, at 724. 
37 See id. at 727. 
38 See Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 165. Ottevanger briefly compares the prohibition of 
soft drugs to the prohibition of alcohol with refel'ence to the 1920s Prohibition Era in the 
United States which is believed to haye resulted in the growth of organized crime, illegal 
jobs and corruption among public officials. See id. at 16&-66. 
39 See KORF, supra note 7, at 44; yan Vliet, supra note 6, at 725. 
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(also referred to as "harm-reduction").40 Because of this dual system, 
coupled with the welfare approach, many people believe that drugs 
have been legalized in the Netherlands.41 The extent of the legality of 
drugs in the Netherlands, however, is a misconception.42 
All narcotics in the Netherlands are considered controlled sub-
stances-some are just more controlled than others.43 The separate 
markets doctrine encompasses the idea of drawing a line between 
hard and soft drugs.44 This distinction is based on legitimate doubts 
about the dangers of soft drugs,45 on doubts that soft drug use leads 
to hard drug use, and on a belief that different treatment will keep 
the drug cultures separate.46 The treatment of hard drugs is just as 
stringent in the Netherlands as it is in other EU countries.47 Soft 
drugs, however, are regulated more leniently.48 
Risk-reduction is the theory that measures should be taken to 
make inevitable drug use as safe as possible for both the individual 
and society.49 This is accomplished through a variety of welfare pro-
grams and harsh penalties for drug-related offenses that are a nui-
sance to the community or that harm society.5o This element of the 
drug policy is also pursued through the separate markets approach 
because it is believed that the isolation of the soft drug culture will 
reduce the risk of cross-over to the more dangerous hard drug cul-
ture.51 
The Netherlands has not always approached drug policy. in the 
fashion described above.52 The 1976 amendments to the Opium Act 
were the result of a recognition that the problems that often cause 
drug use-social, economic, and psychological problems-were not 
40 SeeOttevanger, supra note 7, at 166-67. 
41 See Dick C. Kaa~ager & Marcel de Kort, Mutual Influences between National Drugs Poli-
cies in Europe, in SCHENGEN, JUDICIAL COOPERATION AND POLICY COORDINATION, supra 
note 7, at 181, 185; Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 168. 
-12 SeeOttevanger, supmnote 7, at 168; Berkman, supra note 6, at 179. 
43 See Ottevanger, supm note 7, at 168; Berkman, supm note 6, at 179; van Vliet, supra 
note 6, at 731. 
H See Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 168; van Vliet, supra note 6, at 724-25. 
;15 See Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 167-68. 
-l6 Seevan Kalmthout, supra note 7, at 264. 
47 See Berkman, supra note 6, at 178-79. 
0/8 See id. at 179. See also van Vliet, supra note 6, at 724. 
49 See van Vliet, supra note 6, at 727. See also Ottevanger, supm note 7, at 166-67; van 
Kalmthout, supra note 7, at 263. 
50 SeeOttevanger, supra note 7, at 168; van Kalmthout, supra note 7, at 271-77. 
51 See van Vliet; supra note 6, at 725. 
52 Seevan Kalmthout, supra note 7, at 261; Berkman, supra note 6, at 177; van Vliet, su-
pm note 6, at 722. 
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addressed by the penal approach to drug use.53 In essence, the legisla-
ture, after investigation by and consultation with an appointed multi-
disciplinary committee, sought to implement measures that would 
treat the problem rather than its symptoms.54 
Thus, in conformity with the separate markets and risk-reduction 
concepts, the amendments to the Opium Act increased the penalties 
for the sale and possession of hard drugs and significantly decreased 
those for soft drugs.55 For example, the possession of 30 grams or less 
of marijuana or hashish is characterized as a misdemeanor, rather 
than an offense, and is considered a low priority in terms of investiga-
tion and prosecution.56 Domestic retail of soft drugs, on a small-scale 
basis, is tolerated in designated places, but such retail is subject to 
strict guidelines, the violation of which can result in harsh penalties.57 
The penalties for hard drugs, however, are similar to those in other 
Western European nations. 58 
In contrast to the lenient Dutch drug policy regarding domestic 
situations, the Netherlands maintains a strong stance and active pur-
suit against international drug trafficking.59 The Netherlands invests 
large sums of money in abating international drug trade,60 and since 
July 1995, it has implemented checks on international trains.61 Addi-
tionally, the Dutch government has agreed to apply foreign laws when 
other Schengen nationals are involved in drug prosecution.62 Hence, 
although the policies towards soft drugs within the borders of the 
Netherlands are more lax than other places, the drive to abate inter-
national trade is very strong.63 
53 Sen'an Kalmthout, supra note 7, at 261. 
54 See id. at 261-62; van Vliet, supra note 6, at 722-23. 
55 Sen'an Kalmthout, supra note 7, at 262; van Vliet, supra note 6, at 724. See also KORF, 
supra note 7, at 43-45. 
56 See van Vliet, supra note 6, at 731. 
57 See Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 168. The guidelines include prohibitions against the 
sale of hard drugs and any sale to juveniles, as well as prohibitions against advertising. See 
id. 
58 Seevan Kalmthout, supra note 7, at 266; Berkman. supra note 6, at 178-79. 
59 See Otte\'allger, supra note 7, at 171, 176. 
60 See id. at 17l. 
61 See id. at 176. 
62 Sen'an Vliet, supra note 6. at i-U. 
63 See Ottevangel; supra note i. at 1 i1. 1 i6. 
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II. THE CONCERN ABOUT DRUG TRAFFICKING AND FRANCE'S 
RESISTENCE TO FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SCHENGEN AGREEMENT 
Drug trafficking is a valid national concern for all EU nations.64 
The ability to regulate drugs falls under the auspices of an individual 
nation's police power, and possibly its national security.65 The concept 
of open borders challenges the ability to control what enters and exits 
a participating nation.66 As a result, throughout the discussions re-
garding open borders, both among the Schengen Agreement signa-
tory nations and in the EU as a whole, questions have been posed ad-
dressing measures to be taken to combat drug trafficking in the EU.67 
For example, in 1992, Written Question No. 118/92 to the Commis-
sion of the European Communities inquired into what measures 
would be taken to "combat the growing traffic in drugs in the EC" and 
whether narcotics laws could be harmonized throughout the EC.68 At 
the time, narcotics control was left to the province of each Member 
State, and there was no harmonization of drug laws.69 
In addition to the concerns regarding drug trafficking through-
out the EU, the signatories of the Schengen Agreement have ex-
pressed similar concerns,7o specifically in the Schengen Agreement.71 
Chapter 6 of the Convention includes several Articles regarding the 
prevention and control of drug trafficking. 72 These provisions, how-
ever, are limited to trafficking and do not apply to domestic controI,73 
Unlike the Netherlands, the other original signatory counnies do 
not formally subscribe to the separate markets and non-prohibition 
64 See Written Question No. 118/92 by Ml: Gerd Muller (PPE) to the Commission of 
the Emopean Communities, 1992 OJ. (C 281) 15, 15 [hereinafter Written Question No. 
118/92]; Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 174-76. 
65 SeeOttevanger, supra note 7, at 174-76. 
66 See Heaton, supra note 2, at 645. 
67 See Written Question No. 118/92, supra note 64. 
68 [d. 
69 See id. 
70 See Report of Partial Lifting of French Border Checks-General and Political Af-
fairs-Freedom of Movement-Background Information, Eur. Rep. 2119/IV/8 (1996), 
available in LEXIS, International Law Library, Spicers file [hereinafter Report 2119/IV /8]; 
General and Political Affairs-Freedom of Movement-Background Information, Eur. 
Rep. 1873/1/1 (1993), available in LEXIS, Intemational Law Library, Spicers file [herein-
after Report 1873/1/1]; Kaasjager & de Kort, supra note 41, at 185; van Vliet, supra note 6, 
at 741. 
71 See Convention, supra note 4, at 116--18. 
72 See id. 
73 See id. See also KORF, supra note 7, at 48. 
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approach to drugs. 74 France, for example, imposes harsh penalties for 
personal possession and small-scale dealing, regardless of the type of 
drug. 75 Belgium and Germany are more lenient than France but pre-
scribe minimum penalties that either equal or exceed the maximum 
penalty in the Netherlands for the same offense.76 Due to the concern 
about drug trafficking and the different policies towards drugs since 
the inception of the Schengen Agreement, some of the signatory na-
tions have resisted full implementation.77 
France has been particularly vocal about its resistence.78 In 1996, 
France finally announced that it would partially implement the 
Schengen Agreement by opening its borders with Germany and 
Spain,79 but would "continue to inspect arrivals from Belgium, Lux-
embourg and the Netherlands until it settles its disagreement with 
The Hague over measures to prevent drug trafficking. "80 Although 
the Benelux countries have different approaches to drug policy, the 
fact that they have had open borders amongst themselves since the 
1960s precludes Belgium and Luxembourg from enjoying open bor-
ders with France.81 The fear is that the opening of the borders will 
open the participating countries to an influx of drugs carried by tlle 
people arriving from the Benelux countries.82 
74 See Boutmans, supra note 30, at 89-90; de Celis, supra note 30, at 145-47; Kaasjager 
& de Kort, supra note 41, at 185; Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 166. See also KORF, supra note 
7, at 46-47, For example, France prescribes two to ten years imprisonment for the produc-
tion/ cultivation of cannabis, whereas the majority of ""estel'll European nations cap their 
penalties at five years or less, absent some othel' criteria (i.e., recidhism or commercial 
intent). See KORF, supra note 7, at 46-47. Furthermore, France sets a penalty of two to ten 
years for the mere possession of cannabis in contrast to others whose penalties range fmm 
one month to five years, again, except when certain other criteria are present. See id. 
75 See id, at 46. 
76 See id. at 46-47. 
77 See Report 2119/IV /8, supra note 70; Report 1873/1/1, supra note 70; Schutte, supra 
note 17, at 557-58. 
78 See Report 2119/IV/8, supra note 70; Report 1873/1/1, supra note 70. See also Kaas-
jager & de Kort, supra note 41, at 185. 
79 See Van Lancker, supra note 22, at 62, Spain joined the Schengen Agreement after 
the initial signing. See id. 
80 Report 2119/IV /8, supra note 70. 
81 See id. See also Schutte, supra note 17, at 550. 
82 See Report 2119/IV /8, supra uote 70; Repolt 1873/1/1, supra note 70. Sen'au vliet. 
supra note 6, at 741. 
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III. ANALYSIS-THE REAL SITUATION AND THE CALL FOR OPEN 
BORDERS 
The tension among the signatories of the Schengen Agreement 
regarding the opening of borders and the drug policies of the Neth-
erlands is a pressing concern. The Dutch drug policies have been 
specifically cited as the reason for France's refusal to open its borders 
to citizens of the Benelux countries.83 Accordingly, all persons enter-
ing France from these countries are subject to border control meas-
ures regardless of the lack of any specific act identifying them as a 
threat to national security or public policy.84 
Some believe that the best way, or at least the most likely way, to 
relieve the tension regarding open borders and Dutch drug policies is 
for the Netherlands to bring its laws into accordance with the other 
signatory nations.85 This solution, however, seems ill-advised for two 
reasons. 
First, the drug policies appear to work.86 In terms of problems 
associated with drug use, the situation in the Netherlands is no worse 
than that in other EU nations.87 In fact, in some ways, the Netherlands 
has more control over these problems.88 It has been observed, for ex-
ample, that the separate markets approach wor~ and that soft drug 
users rarely turn to hard drug use.89 In addition, although compulsive 
drug use has not been eliminated, hard drug use has decreased, and 
the percentage of addicts in the Netherlands is significantly lower 
than in the other original signatory states, with the exception of Bel-
gium where it is about the same.90 
Second, other nations have begun to consider the possibility of 
aligning their drug laws with those of the Netherlands.91 For example, 
the separate markets approach appears in other nations.92 Italy and 
Spain, recent additions to the Schengen Agreement, differ from the 
Netherlands in terms of penalties, but formally draw a distinction be-
83 Report 2119/IV/8, supra note 70. 
84 See id. 
85 See Berkman, supra note 6, at 180-82. 
86 See van Vliet, supra note 6, at 737. 
87 See Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 169. Studies show that, in comparison to many other 
EU nations, the Netherlands has fewer AIDS sufferers and a significantly lower rate of 
drug-related deaths. See id. at 169-73. 
88 See id. 
89 See van Vliet, supra note 6, at 728. 
90 See Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 170. 
91 See van Vliet, supra note 6, at 747-48. 
92 See id. See also KoRF, supra note 7, at 46-47. 
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tween hard and soft drugs.93 Additionally, although many other coun-
tries do not formally observe separate markets, many do so in prac-
tice.94 Furthermore, signatory nations, including France, are begin-
ning to incorporate risk-reduction measures into their policies.95 It 
would not make sense for the Netherlands to take a step backwards 
and return drug control to the sole province of crime control when 
other nations are moving in the opposite direction. 
Since 1987, the Netherlands has increased control over narcotics 
in response to the fears of the Schengen Agreement signatory na-
tions.96 For example, since October 1, 1996, the guidelines governing 
the small-scale retail of soft drugs in coffeeshops (small-scale cannabis 
retail outlets) have been tightened.97 In addition, the Netherlands has 
applied foreign laws in its jurisdiction in cases involving nationals 
from other signatory nations98 and has worked with its neighbors 
against international trafficking.99 
Given the actual situation in the Netherlands, there does not ap-
pear to be a real threat to France or other nations who may open 
their borders to the Benelux countries. IOO The Netherlands' liberal 
approach to drug policy is limited to the domestic sphere.lOI The laws 
allow for decreased penalties for the possession of a small quantity of 
cannabis products and regulate the sale of such products in desig-
nated locales.102 Dutch drug laws, like those of the other EU coun-
tries, are tough on drug trafficking, thus minimizing its impact on 
other nations. I03 This is not to say that drug trafficking does not exist, 
but rather that it is not a result of the treatment of drugs in the Neth-
erlands. I04 In fact, the Netherlands has implemented a number of 
measures to curb international drug trafficking. I05 
93 See KORF, Sllpra note 7, at 47-49. 
94 See Kaasjager & de Kort, supra note 41, at 188. 
95 See id. at 186-87. 
96 Seevan Vliet, supra note 6, at 743-44. 
97 See Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 177. 
98 See van Vliet, supra note 6, at 744. 
99 See Otte\'angel; supra note 7, at 176. 
100 See KORF, supra note 7, at 48; Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 176; van Kahllthout, supra 
note 7, at 262. 
101 See KORF, supra note 7, at 60. See also Ottevangel; supra note 7, at 171, 176. 
102 See van Vliet, supra note 6, at 731. 
103 See id. See also Ottevangel; supra note 7, at 171. 176. 
104 See id. 
105 See Ottevanger, Sllpra note 7, at 171, 176. 
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Because the Schengen Agreement calls for the gradual opening 
of internal borders,106 France is not technically in violation of the 
Agreement. France's refusal, however, contradicts the provisions that 
the Schengen Agreement lays out to address national security and po-
lice power issues.107 The Agreement asserts that measures may be 
taken for "a limited period" and must be "appropriate to the situ a-
tion."I08 France, instead, maintains a blanket refusal to open its bor-
ders to the Benelux countries because of an unsubstantiated threat. I09 
In light ofthe efforts by the Netherlands since 1987, a novel option to 
ease the tension would be for France to meet the Netherlands half-
way and fully implement the Schengen Agreement, abiding by the 
provisions of Article 2 of the Convention.110 If France finds that there 
is an actual threat, Article 2(2) ofthe Convention will allow it to enact 
border control measures once again. lll 
France, the most vocal opponent to opening its borders to the 
Benelux countries, signed the Schengen Agreement with full knowl-
edge of the Dutch drug policies. ll2 Despite the efforts of the Nether-
lands to address the signatories' concerns regarding the Dutch drug 
policy, France has continued to refuse to open its borders.1l3 Fur-
thermore, the Schengen Agreement began as an informal agreement 
between France and Germany.1l4 The leaders of the Benelux coun-
tries joined in order to broaden their already open borders.1l5 Thus, 
the countries to which France refused to open its borders may be 
viewed as having interfered with France's plans. Given these facts, it is 
unclear whether France ever intended to open its borders to the 
Netherlands and the other Benelux countries.1l6 
106 Schellgen Agreement, supra note 4, at 68. The title of me agreement is me "Schen-
gen Agreement on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders" (emphasis 
added). See id. 
107 See Convention, supra note 4, art. 2(2). 
108 Id. 
109 See Report 2119/IV/8, supra note 70; Report 1873/1/1, supra note 70; Berkman, su-
pra note 6, at 177; van Vliet, supra note 6, at 724. 
110 See generally Schengen Agreement, supra note 4. 
III See Convention, supra note 4, art. 2 (2). 
112 See van Vliet, supra note 6, at 724 (Dutch drug policy adopted in 1976, nine years 
before Schengen Agreement); see also Kaasjager & de Kort, supra note 41, at 185. 
113 See Report 2119/IV /8, supra note 70; van Vliet, supra note 6, at 743--44. 
114 See Schutte, supra note 17, at 549. 
115 See id. 
116 See Van Lanckel~ supra note 22, at 64 (reference to France finding several "security" 
l'easons not to fully implement me Schengen Agreement). 
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CONCLUSION 
Freedom of movement is a fundamental goal of the EU. It has 
supposedly been embraced by the signatories of the Schengen 
Agreement, although full implementation is still wanting. Essentially, 
the recognized impediment to the full implementation of the Schen-
gen Agreement is the fear of the influence of the Dutch drug policies. 
The experience in the Netherlands, however, indicates that such fears 
are unfounded. The extent to which drug use is tolerated in the 
Netherlands does not imply that if controls at the Benelux borders 
are removed, drug trafficking will increase in the participating na-
tions. 
France was willing to sign the Schengen Agreement in 1985. Ab-
sent a showing of an actual threat, it should be willing to implement 
what it signed. Until France accepts the success of the Netherlands 
and agrees to open its borders absent some actual threat to national 
security or public policy, the freedom of movement within this region 
of the EU will remain at a standstill. Given the location of the Benelux 
countries, tucked away between France, Germany, and the North Sea, 
these countries will not be able to fully enjoy the freedom of move-
ment and, therefore, will not be able to benefit from the agreement 
they signed over a decade ago. 
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